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By WILLBuRT D. HAM*
INTRODUCTION
Following the format used in previous Surveys, I developments
in corporation law at the federal level will be discussed first. This
discussion will be followed by review of a group of selected cases
dealing with corporate law principles at the state level.
At the federal level, the present Survey period was marked by
two significant decisions from the Supreme Court of the United
States interpreting section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5. The
first of these decisions considers the obligations of a "tippee" who
comes into possession of nonpublic corporate information.2 The
second decision deals with the extent to which a private civil cause
of action may be implied under section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 for conduct which is also covered by the
express civil liability provisions of section 11 of the Securities Act
of 1933.1 Discussion of these two Supreme Court cases will be
followed by comments on two cases from the First Circuit Court
of Appeals, one examining disgorgement of insider trading profits
* Professor of Law, University of Kentucky, B.S. 1937, J.D. 1940, University of
Illinois; LL.M. 1941, Harvard University.
I For previous corporation law surveys, see Ham, Kentucky Law Survey-
Corporations, 71 Ky. L.J. 251 (1982-83); Ham, Kentucky Law Survey-Corporations, 70
KY. L.J. 223 (1981-82); Ham, Kentucky Law Survey-Corporations, 69 Ky. L.J. 453
(1980-81); Ham, Kentucky Law Survey-Corporations, 68 Ky. L.J. 495 (1979-80); Ham,
Kentucky Law Survey-Corporations, 67 Ky. L.J. 457 (1978-79); Ham, Kentucky Law
Survey-Corporations, 66 Ky. L.J. 477 (1977-78); Ham, Kentucky Law Survey-
Corporations, 65 Ky. L.J. 255 (1976-77); Ham, Kentucky Law Survey-Corporations, 64
KY. L.J. 253 (1975-76); Ham, Kentucky Law Survey-Corporations, 63 Ky. L.J. 739
(1974-75).
See Dirks v. SEC, 103 S.Ct. 3255 (1983).
See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 103 S.Ct. 683 (1983).
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under the federal securities laws' and the other evaluating the scope
of aiding and abetting liability under those laws.'
Discussion of recent developments at the state level will begin
with review of a significant decision by the Supreme Court of
Delaware dealing with parent-subsidiary mergers.6 This will be
followed by an analysis of the recent decision by the Supreme Court
of Kentucky declaring the Kentucky Take-Over Act unconstitu-
tional.7 The discussion will conclude with analysis of a decision
by the Supreme Court of Delaware concerning the right of
shareholders to inspect the books and records of a corporation
and a decision by the Supreme Court of Utah regarding the
authority of a corporate president to initiate legal proceedings on
behalf of the corporation.9
I. FEDERAL CORPORATION LAW
A. Insider Trading
Perhaps no aspect of Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) Rule lOb-5,' 0 promulgated by the Commission under the
authority of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,"
See SEC v. MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47 (lst Cir. 1983).
See Cleary v. Perfectune, Inc., 700 F.2d 774 (1st Cir. 1983).
6 See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
See Esmark, Inc. v. Strode, 639 S.W.2d 768 (Ky. 1982), rev'g 28 Ky. L. Suma.
5, at 2 (Ky. Ct. App. April 13, 1981) [hereinafter cited as KLS].
See CM & M Group, Inc. v. Carroll, 453 A.2d 788 (Del. 1982).
See Lloydona Peters Enterprises, Inc. v. Dorius, 658 P.2d 1209 (Utah 1983).
10 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1983). The full text of this rule reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or
of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976). This section reads:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or
of any facility of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
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has assumed more significance in recent years than its use by the
SEC in policing insider trading activity in the securities of American
corporations.' 2 However, determining the contours of liability under
rule 10b-5 for this kind of activity has proven difficult,' 3 and re-
cent decisions by the Supreme Court of the United States have
served notice that liability under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 is
not unlimited.'" This was made particularly evident by the Court's
decision in Chiarella v. United States,' 5 in which the Court rejected
the position that a printer employed by a financial printing firm
could be held liable under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 for trading
on nonpublic market information.' 6 Recently, the Supreme Court
further underscored its restrictive attitude when, in Dirks v. SEC,'7
the Court refused to extend rule 1Ob-5 liability to a securities analyst
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contraven-
tion of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors.
Id.
12 See Branson, Discourse on the Supreme Court Approach to SEC Rule 10b-5 and
Insider Trading, 30 EMORY L.J. 263 (1981). The SEC has given "insider trading" top priority
in its enforcement program. When John M. Fedders became director of the Division of
Enforcement in 1981, he commented that "[t]he Commission [would] 'intensify its efforts
to prevent, detect and prosecute' trading based on non-public information." [July-Dec.]
SEC. R G. & L. REP (BNA) No. 624, at A-5 (Oct. 14, 1981). During 1982, the SEC sent
to Congress a proposed Insider Trading Sanctions Act which would empower the SEC "to
bring an action for an order requiring the inside trader, or any person aiding and abetting
the trader's violation, to pay into the Treasury of the United States an amount of money
up to three times the profit gained or loss avoided through the illicit transactions." 14 SEC.
REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 38, at 1705 (Oct. 1, 1982). Recently, the Commission, in a
proposed revised version of its draft legislation, agreed, among other things, to confine
the imposition of treble damages to those who actually trade on the basis of material non-
public information or who pass the-information on to others who trade, removing aiding
and abetting liability other than as to tippers. See 15 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 28,
at 1337 (July 15, 1983).
" See Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and InformationalAdvantages Under the Federal
Securities Laws, 93 HARv. L. Rav. 322 (1979).
14 See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (manipulative or decep-
tive conduct requirement); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (scienter re-
quirement); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (purchaser-seller
standing requirement). See generally Lowenfels, Recent Supreme Court Decisions Under
the Federal Securities Laws: The Pendulum Swings, 65 Gao. L.J. 891 (1977).
" 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
"6 Id. at 235. See Cann, A Duty to Disclose? An Analysis of Chiarella v. United States,
85 Dicrc. L. Ray. 249 (1981).
-1 103 S.Ct. 3255 (1983).
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who "tipped" material nonpublic information which he had
received from inside corporate sources."1
Dirks grew out of the spectacular Equity Funding fraud which
received widespread publicity a few years ago.' 9 Dirks, an officer
in a New York broker-dealer firm, had received information from
a former officer of Equity Funding of America that the assets of
the corporation, which consisted primarily of life insurance policies,
were greatly overstated.2" On the basis of an extensive investiga-
tion, Dirks was able to substantiate the charges.2" During the in-
vestigation, although neither Dirks nor his firm traded in any Equi-
ty Funding stock, Dirks revealed his informaton to a number of
clients and investors who liquidated their holdings of Equity Fun-
ding securities.2 2 During this period the price of Equity Funding
stock on the market fell sharply resulting in the New York Stock
Exchange taking action to halt trading in the stock. 23 After Califor-
nia insurance authorities uncovered evidence of the fraud, the
Securities and Exchange Commission filed a complaint against
Equity Funding, and the Wall Street Journal published a front-
page story of the fraud, basing the story largely on information
possessed by Dirks. 24 Subsequently, in an administrative pro-
ceeding, the SEC found Dirks to have aided and abetted violations
11 Id. at 3266-68. There is support in the lower federal courts for subjecting trading
tippees to rule lOb-5 liability. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974). By treating certain institutional investors liable as trading
tippees in Shapiro, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals confirmed a similar position as
to these institutional investors that had been taken earlier by the Securities and Exchange
Commission when, in an administrative proceeding, the Commission had approved a deter-
mination by a hearing examiner that the institutional investors should be censored for their
conduct. See In re Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C. 633 (1971). But see Fridrich v.
Bradford, 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977). See generally
Rapp, Fridrich v. Bradford and the Scope of Insider Trading Liability Under SEC Rule
10b-5: A Commentary, 38 Omo ST. L.J. 67 (1977); Rapp & Loeb, Tippee Liability and
Rule l0b-5, 1971 U. ILL. L.F. 55.
,9 See Robertson, Those Daring Young Con Men of Equity Funding, FORTUNE,
August 1973, at 81.




24 Id. at 3258-59. While Dirks was pursuing his investigation of the fraud charges,
he tried to get a representative of the Wall Street Journal to write a story about the alleg-
ed fraud but the representative refused to do so for fear of the possible libelous nature
of the information. Id. at 3258.
[Vol. 72
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of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 by revealing his information about
the Equity Funding fraud to investors before the information had
been made public.2" However, in deference to Dirks' efforts to un-
cover the Equity Funding fraud, the SEC only ordered Dirks
censured.26
On review, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit accepted the judgment of the Commission, adopting the
position of the Commission that "tippees" become subject to the
same "disclose or abstain" rule as their corporate confidants with
regard to material nonpublic corporate information.2 7 The Supreme
Court then granted certiorari.2"
Reversing the judgment of the court of appeals, Justice Powell,
writing for the Supreme Court, reaffirmed the position taken by
the Court in Chiarella that nondisclosure can constitute an
actionable fraud only where there exists "a duty to disclose arising
"5 See In re Raymond L. Dirks, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
82,812 (S.E.C. Jan. 22, 1981) (citing SEC v. Cowen, 581 F.2d 1020, 1028 (2d Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 950 (1979); SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 811
(2d Cir. 1975)), enforced sub nom. Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd,
103 S.Ct. 3255 (1983). Adopting the position that "both corporate insiders and their 'tip-
pees' are liable for trading violations of those whom they, in turn, 'tip' "the SEC concluded:
Where "tippees"-regardless of their motivation or occupation-come into
possession of material "corporate information that they know is confidential and
know or should know came from a corporate insider," they must either public-
ly disclose that information or refrain from trading. In addition, under aiding
and abetting principles, a non-trading tipper is liable where he knew or should
have known that his tippee would be likely to trade.
Id. at 83,945 (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. at 230 n.12). See also Elkind
v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., FED. Sac. L. RaP. 97,716, at 98,754 (2d Cir. Dec. 4, 1980).
26 See [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) at 83,950-51. An ad-
ministrative law judge before whom the matter was first heard had concluded that Dirks
should receive a 60-day suspension from association with any broker or dealer. Id. at 83,941.
In its review of the findings of the administrative law judge, the Commission, while recogniz-
ing the importance and value of the work performed by securities analysts in gathering and
analyzing information for the benefit of investors, nevertheless determined that "the analysts'
role, like that of any other person, is constrained by the well-established proscriptions of
the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws." Id. at 83,950. However, the Com-
mission decided that due to Dirks' previous unblemished record in the securities industry
and his role in bringing the Equity Funding fraud to light, the sanction imposed by the
administrative law judge was too severe and should be reduced. Id.
2? See Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d at 824. Stressing the high standard of ethical behavior
expected of broker-dealers, the court of appeals offered the suggestion that Dirks could
be considered as having "obligations to the SEC and to the public completely independent
of any obligations he acquired" under the tippee doctrine. Id. at 840.
11 Dirks v. SEC, 103 S.Ct. at 371.
KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL [Vol. 72
from a relationship of trust and confidence between parties to a
transaction." 29 Rejecting once again the SEC's "equal access"
theory as to material nonpublic information,3" Justice Powell
observed: "This conflicts with the principle set forth in Chiarella
that only some persons, under some circumstances, will be barred
from trading while in possession of material nonpublic
information." 3' He further expressed the opinion that "[i]mpos-
ing a duty to disclose or abstain solely because a person knowing-
ly receives material nonpublic information from an insider and
trades on it could have an inhibiting influence on the role of market
analysts, which the SEC itself recognizes is necessary to the preser-
vation of a healthy market."32 Recognizing, however, the clear need
for a ban on some tippee trading, he took the position that such
29 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. at 230. See 103 S.Ct. at 3261. In both Chiarella
and Dirks the Court relied heavily on the test for insider trading which had been enun-
ciated by the SEC in the case of In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961), where
Commissioner Cary, writing for the Commission, had said:
Analytically, the obligation [to disclose or abstain] rests on two principal elements;
first, the existence of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to in-
formation intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the
personal benefit of anyone, and second, the inherent unfairness involved where
a party takes advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to those
with whom he is dealing.
Id. at 912.
11 103 S.Ct. at 3262. The Commission's "equal access" theory seems to have had
its roots in the case of In re Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C. at 633, in which the
Commission, dropping the special relationship portion of its Cady, Roberts test, had stated:
We consider that one who obtains possession of material, non-public corporate
information, which he has reason to know emanates from a corporate source,
and which by itself places him in a position superior to other investors, thereby
acquires a relationship with respect to that information within the purview and
restraints of the antifraud provisions.
Id. at 644. Commissioner Smith, who concurred in the result reached in the Investors
Management case, nevertheless detected the broadening of the test as formulated by the
Commission into one emphasizing "relative informational advantages in the marketplace."
Id. at 648 (Smith, Comm'r, concurring). Referring to such a test as being, in his opinion,
too vague to apply with any consistency, he said that he would prefer to continue the tradi-
tional emphasis in terms of persons "knowing or having reason to know that the material
non-public information became available to them in breach of a duty owed to the corpora-
tion not to disclose or use the information for non-corporate purposes." Id. at 648-50 (Smith,
Comm'r, concurring).
103 S.Ct. at 3262.
32 Id. at 3263.
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a ban should occur only when inside information has been made
available to such persons improperly." So, he concluded:
[A] tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a cor-
poration not to trade on material nonpublic information only
when the insider has breached his fiduciary duty to the
shareholders by disclosing the information to the tippee and the
tippee knows or should know that there has been a breach.3"
The test, he said, for determining whether the insider has breached
a fiduciary duty "is whether the insider personally will benefit,
directly or indirectly, from his disclosure." 35 This means "[a]bsent
some personal gain, there has been no breach of duty to
stockholders," 6 and, "absent a breach by the insider, there is no
derivative breach."" Under the inside-trading and tipping rules thus
enunciated, Justice Powell found no violation of these rules on the
part of Dirks, since the Equity Funding employees did not violate
their fiduciary obligations to the shareholders of Equity Funding
by informing Dirks of the Equity Funding fraud.3"
In adopting the "personal gain" test for testing insider trading
activity, Justice Powell conceded that "[d]etermining whether an
insider personally benefits from a particular disclosure, a question
of fact, will not always be easy for courts." 3 9 But, he said:
[I]t is essential, we think, to have a guiding principle for those
whose daily activities must be limited and instructed by the SEC's
inside-trading rules, and we believe that there must be a breach
of the insider's fiduciary duty before the tippee inherits the du-
ty to disclose or abstain. In contrast, the rule adopted by the SEC
in this case would have no limiting principle."
In a vigorous dissent, in which Justices Brennan and Marshall
concurred, Justice Blackmun once again chastised the Court, as
he had done on previous occasions, for taking what he called
11 Id. at 3264.
34 Id.
11 Id. at 3265.
36 Id.
37 Id.
" Id. at 3267.
Id. at 3266.
, Id. (footnote omitted).
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"another step to limit the protections provided investors by § 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.2 41 Referring to the Court's
position that insider liability depends on breach of a fiduciary rela-
tionship between the insider and the trading shareholders and that
tippees become liable as participants in the breach after the fact
by acting with knowledge of the breach, 2 Justice Blackmun found
no support for engrafting a special motivational requirement on
the fiduciary duty doctrine requiring the insider to have acted with
the improper purpose of personal gain. 3 Adopting the position that
"corporate insiders have an affirmative duty of disclosure when
trading with shareholders of the corporation,"" Justice Blackmun
concluded that "[t]he fact that the insider himself does not benefit
from the breach does not eradicate the shareholder's injury."
'45
In evaluating the significance of Dirks it may well be that, on
its facts, it was somewhat of an atypical case. Indeed, Justice
Powell conceded that it was in his majority opinion." Thus, Dirks
may not greatly affect future insider trading cases .4 However, what
" Id. at 3268 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In the Blue Chip Stamps case, which
established the purchaser-seller standing requirement for plaintiffs suing under § 10(b) and
rule lOb-5, Justice Blackmun had charged the Court with exhibiting "a preternatural
solicitousness for corporate well-being and a seeming callousness toward the investing
public." See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. at 762 (Blackmun, J., dissen-
ting). A year later, in the Hochfelder case, which established a scienter requirement for
liability under § 10(b) and rule 10b-5, he remarked that once again the Court had inter-
preted these provisions "restrictively and narrowly," thereby stultifying recovery for the
victim. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 215-16 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). And,
in the Santa Fe Industries case, in which the Court stressed the need for a showing of decep-
tive or manipulative conduct to establish a cause of action under § 10(b) and rule 10b-5,
Justice Blackmun spoke of the broad language in Part IV of the Court's opinion rejecting
the use of § 10(b) and rule lOb-5 to reach transactions involving internal corporate
mismanagement as "exacerbating the concerns" he had expressed in his dissents in Blue
Chip Stamps and Hochfelder. Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. at 480 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part).
" 103 S.Ct. at 3270 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
"' Id. at 3271 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
", Id. at 3269 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S.
at 227).
I d. at 3271 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing A. SCOTT, SCOTT ON TRUSTS § 205,
at 1665 (1967); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 205 comments c-d).
46 Id. at 3263 n.18.
41 Officials at the Securities and Exchange Commission are reported to have refer-
red to the case as "unique" and "unusual" and to have expressed the opinion that the
case should not seriously jeopardize the agency's enforcement program. See 15 SEC. REG.
& L. REP. (BNA) No. 26, at 1293 (July 8, 1983).
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may be of more importance to the future law of insider trading
is again the "tone" of the majority opinion which seems to sug-
gest a continued attitude of caution on the part of the Supreme
Court in extending the boundaries of insider trading liability under
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule
lOb-5."
B. Implied Remedies
A second noteworthy Supreme Court case decided during the
present survey period was Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston.
4
1
This case considered whether a private civil cause of action may
be implied under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 where an express civil remedy for the same conduct exists
under other provisions of the securities laws.5 0 Specifically, the issue
in Huddleston was "whether purchasers of registered securities who
allege they were defrauded by misrepresentations in a registration
statement may maintain an action under Section 10(b) notwith-
standing the express remedy for misstatements and omissions in
registration statements provided by Section 11 of the Securities Act
of 1933."l'
In Huddleston, Texas International Speedway, Inc. (TIS) had
filed a registration statement and prospectus with the Securities and
Exchange Commission for a public offering of securities, the pro-
ceeds of which were to be used to finance the construction of an
automobile speedway.52 Although the entire issue was sold on the
offering date, the venture was not successful and resulted in the
corporation filing a bankruptcy petition. 3 Purchasers of TIS
11 See Whitaker & Rotch, The Supreme Court and the Counter-Revolution in
Securities Regulation, 30 ALA. L. REv. 335 (1979).
,9 103 S.Ct. 683 (1983).
1o Id. at 690. This problem has plagued the lower federal courts for many years. See
Comment, Implied Rights of Action in Federal Legislation: Harmonization Within the
Statutory Scheme, 1980 DutcE L.J. 928.
11 103 S.Ct. at 685. Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 makes available to pur-
chasers of securities an express civil remedy for misstatements and omissions contained in
a registration statement unless the persons designated by the section as responsible for such
misstatements or omissions (except for the issuer itself) can establish a due diligence defense.
See 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1976).




securities filed a class action in federal district court under section
10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5 against participants in the offering, in-
cluding the accounting firm of Herman & MacLean. The plain-
tiffs claimed that the defendants had fraudulently misrepresented
the financial condition of TIS."1 The district judge concluded that
Herman & MacLean and others had violated section 10(b) and rule
lOb-5 by having made "fraudulent misrepresentations in the TIS
registration statement."" He accordingly entered judgment for
plaintiffs.56 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
the plaintiffs in Huddleston should be permitted to maintain a suit
under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 even if defendants' conduct
might also subject them to liability under section 11 of the Securities
Act of 1933 .57 The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the issue
of whether an implied cause of action under section 10(b) of the
1934 Act would lie for conduct which apparently also provided a
basis for a damage action under section 11 of the 1933 Act."
In affirming the holding of the court of appeals that plaintiffs
could maintain their section 10(b) action under the 1934 Act
regardless of the availability of the section 11 action under the 1933
Act,59 the Supreme Court stated that "[t]he resolution of this issue
turns on the fact that the two provisions involve distinct causes of
action and were intended to address different types of
wrongdoing." 6 The Court pointed out:
54 Id.
, Id. at 685-86.
56 Id. at 686.
Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 543 (5th Cir. 1981). For a discus-
sion of the fifth circuit decision, see Ham, Kentucky Law Survey-Corporations, 70 Ky.
L.J. 223, 237-40 (1981-82).
Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 456 U.S. 914 (1982).
, 103 S.Ct. at 686. While affirming the decision of the court of appeals on the cause
of action issue, the Supreme Court reversed the position of the court of appeals that plaintiffs
in § 10(b) suits must establish their case by clear and convincing evidence rather than by
a preponderance of the evidence. Id. Noting that "[t]he Court of Appeals relied primarily
on the traditional use of a higher burden of proof in civil fraud actions at common law,"
but that "an important purpose of the federal securities statutes was to rectify perceived
deficiencies in the available common law protections by establishing higher standards of
conduct in the securities industry," the Supreme Court said that "[w]e therefore decline
to depart from the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard generally applicable in civil ac-
tions." Id. at 691-92.
60 Id. at 687.
[Vol. 72
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While a Section 11 action must be brought by a purchaser of a
registered security, must be based on misstatements or omissions
in a registration statement, and can only be brought against cer-
tain parties, a Section 10(b) action can be brought by a purchaser
or seller of "any security" against "any person" who has used
"any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of a security. 6'
Furthermore, the Court observed, since proof of scienter on the
part of a defendant is necessary under section 10(b) of the 1934
Act,62 whereas mere negligent conduct may be sufficient under sec-
tion 11 of the 1933 Act, 63 the added burden of proving scienter
which attaches to suits filed under section 10(b) "will not 'nullify'
the procedural restrictions that apply to the express remedies.''64
The Court had expressed this concern in Hochfelder when it
adopted the "scienter" requirement for section 10(b) actions.65
Stressing that "[tihe effectiveness of the broad proscription against
fraud in Section 10(b) would be undermined if its scope were
restricted by the existence of an express remedy under Section
11,'" the Court "reject[ed] an interpretation of the securities laws
that displaces an action under Section 10(b)." 67
The decision by the Supreme Court in Huddleston on the im-
6, Id. at 687-88 (emphasis in original).
62 Id. at 688. The scienter requirement was imposed by the Supreme Court in
Hochfelder, where the Court decided that a private damage action would not lie under §
10(b) and rule 10b-5 "in the absence of any allegation of 'scienter'-intent to deceive,
manipulate, or defraud." Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 193.
11 103 S.Ct. at 687. The negligence standard under § 11 of the 1933 Act stems from
the defense given defendants (other than the issuer) by the section, allowing them to escape
liability if they exercised "due diligence." See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b).
11 103 S.Ct. at 689. The procedural restrictions alluded to by the Court relate to such
things as the requirement in § 11 that a plaintiff may be required to post a bond for costs
and the short statute of limitations provided for in § 13 of the 1933 Act. Id. at 688 n.18.
" See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 185. Referring to the procedural
limitations imposed under the 1933 Act, the Court in Hochfelder stated: "We think these
procedural limitations indicate that the judicially created private damages remedy under
§ 10(b)-which has no comparable restrictions-cannot be extended, consistently with the
intent of Congress, to actions premised on negligent wrongdoing." Id. at 210 (footnote
omitted). To do so "would allow causes of action covered by [the express actions] to be
brought instead under § 10(b) and thereby nullify the effectiveness of the carefully drawn
procedural restrictions on these express actions." Id. (footnote omitted).




plied remedy issue, while reasonable enough as a matter of legal
theory, may come as somewhat of a surprise in view of the recent
efforts on the part of the Court to reduce the number of plain-
tiffs eligible to bring rule lOb-5 actionsY.6 Equally significant was
the Court's reference to the statement, first made by the Court in
SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 69 and later repeated
in Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co.,7"
that section 10(b) of the 1934 Act should be read flexibly, not
technically and restrictively."
This revitalized liberal language by the Court may have taken
further root as a result of the recent action by the Court in vacating
a judgment of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and remanding
the case for further consideration in light of the Court's ruling in
Huddleston. In Chemetron Corporation v. Business Funds, Inc.,"
Chemetron had claimed it had been defrauded as the result of a
stock manipulation scheme in violation of section 9(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934,11 as well as SEC Rule 10b-5 under
section 10(b) of the 1934 Act.74 Section 9(e) of the 1934 Act
expressly makes available a private civil damage action in favor
of those persons who sustain damages as a result of any act or
transaction prohibited by section 9." The Fifth Circuit Court of
11 See Lowenfels, supra note 14, at 891.
69 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963).
70 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971).
7" 103 S.Ct. at 690.
72 103 S.Ct. 1245 (1983).
" 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a) (1976).
" See Chemetron Corp. v. Business Funds, Inc., 682 F.2d 1149, 1155-56 (5th Cir.
1982), vacated, 103 S.Ct. at 1245. Chemetron also asserted violations of the Texas securities
laws. Id. at 1155. These claims are discussed in Part III, B. of the court's opinion. Id. at
1170-82.
's 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) states:
Any person who willfully participates in any act or transaction in viola-
tion of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section, shall be liable to any person
who shall purchase or sell any security at a price which was affected by such act
or transaction, and the person so injured may sue in law or in equity in any court
of competent jurisdiction to recover the damages sustained as a result of any such
act or transaction. In any such suit the court may, in its discretion, require an
undertaking for the payment of the costs of such suit, and assess reasonable costs,
including reasonable attorneys' fees, against either party litigant. Every person
who becomes liable to make any payment under this subsection may recover con-
tribution as in cases of contract from any person who, if joined in the original
[Vol. 72
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Appeals held that, since the fraudulent conduct alleged by
Chemetron came within the manipulative practices condemned by
section 9(a), Chemetron could not maintain its suit under section
10(b). 76 In adopting this position the court was influenced by the
fact that the requirements for maintaining a suit under the express
civil liability provisions of section 9(a) were different in material
respects from those required under section 10(b). 77 The court noted
that "[wihile Rule lOb-5 permits recklessness to fulfill its scienter
requirement, ' 78 the language and legislative history of section 9
"do not permit us to loosen its scienter requirement by permitting
recklessness to suffice." ' 79 In addition, the court observed that the
fraudulent conduct proscribed by section 9(a), as implemented by
section 9(e), must "affect" the price of securities, whereas the fraud
under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 need only "touch" the sale or
purchase of securities. 80 Thus, the court said, to recognize a cause
of action under rule lOb-5 would impermissibly nullify "Congress'
deliberate and careful limitations on the express statutory remedy"
under section 9(a).81 The jury had found that the manipulative con-
duct charged by Chemetron had not "affected" the price of the
stock that Chemetron had acquired. 82 It appeared, however, that
suit, would have been liable to make the same payment. No action shall be main-
tained to enforce any liability created under this section, unless brought within
one year after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation and within three
years after such violation.
76 682 F.2d at 1169-70.
Id. at 1162.
Id. It perhaps should be observed that while the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,
and courts in other circuits have treated "recklessness" as within the scienter standard enun-
ciated by the Supreme Court in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 185, the court
in Chemetron recognized that the Supreme Court in Hochfelder expressly refrained from
commiting itself on that issue. 682 F.2d at 1161 n.15. In Hochfelder, the Supreme Court
remarked: "In certain areas of the law recklessness is considered to be a form of inten-
tional conduct for purposes of imposing liability for some act. We need not address here
the question whether, in some circumstances, reckless behavior is sufficient for civil liability
under § 10(b) and Rule l0b-5." 425 U.S. at 194 n.12.
' 682 F.2d at 1162.
Id. The "touching" concept as to liability under rule lOb-5 had its origins in the
statement made by Justice Douglas in Bankers Life where he remarked: "The crux of the
present case is that Manhattan suffered an injury as a result of deceptive practices touching
its sale of securities as an investor." Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty
Co., 404 U.S. at 12-13 (emphasis added).
682 F.2d at 1163.
Id. at 1162.
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the manipulative conduct had ultimately contributed to the collapse
of the corporation whose stock Chemetron had purchased. 3 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari but immediately vacated the judg-
ment of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and remanded the case
for further consideration in light of its decision in Huddleston.84
The action taken by the Supreme Court in Chemetron raises
the question as to what message the Court was seeking to convey
to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals." Was the Court in effect
saying that it had decided in Huddleston that the existence of
express civil remedies under the securities laws should not be
deemed to interfere with the use of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5
regardless of the effect that allowing use of section 10(b) and rule
lOb-5 might have on the express civil remedies in view of the need
for a "cumulative construction of the securities laws"?', If so, such
a position by the Court would seem to conflict with the concern
the Court had expressed in cases such as Hochfelder that section
See id. at 1155.
" Chemetron Corp. v. Business Funds, Inc., 103 S.Ct. at 1245.
8 It is interesting to note that the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals was the same court
that had decided the Huddleston case before it went to the Supreme Court. Although the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decided Chemetron before the Supreme Court had handed
down its decision in Huddleston, the distinction which the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
drew in Chemetron between a situation like that in Chemetron where recognition of an
implied cause of action would operate to nullify an express remedy and that involved in
Huddleston where recognition of the implied cause of action would merely supplement the
express remedy seemed to find support in the opinion written by Justice Powell for the
Supreme Court in Huddleston. Powell stated that in relation to the added burden of prov-
ing scienter in suits brought under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, "invocation of the Sec-
tion 10(b) remedy will not 'nullify' the procedural restrictions that apply to the express
remedies" under the 1933 Act. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 103 S.Ct. at 689.
86 Cf. id. Some of the language used by Justice Powell in Huddleston might suggest
such a conclusion. For example, in commenting on the purpose of the 1933 Act to pro-
vide protection to investors in registered securities, he said: "It would be anomalous in-
deed if the special protection [sic] afforded to purchasers in a registered offering by the
1933 Act were deemed to deprive such purchasers of the protections against manipulation
and deception that Section 10(b) makes available to all persons who deal in securities."
Id. at 688.
Since the preparation of this Article, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has held on
remand in the Chemetron case that, in view of the "broad and unrestrictive analysis" of
express and implied remedies by the Supreme Court in Huddleston, Chemetron should not
be denied its section 10(b) remedy because of the presence of the express civil remedy under
section 9(a) of the 1933 Act. See Chemetron Corp. v. Business Funds, Inc., [Current Binder]
FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 99,541 (5th Cir. Oct. 31, 1983).
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10(b) should not be construed so as to nullify the effectiveness of
the express civil liability provisions of the securities acts.87 The view
stated above would also seem to conflict with the Court's emphasis
in Huddleston that permitting the section 10(b) action under the
1934 Act would not serve to nullify the section 11 action under the
1933 Act in view of the added burden of proving scienter in sec-
tion 10(b) actions." It may well be that such is not the message
the Court had in mind in remanding the Chemetron case, but cer-
tainly Chemetron would appear to provide a further opportunity
for the Court to clarify its position as to the proper relationship
between express and implied remedies under the securities acts.8 9
C. Disgorgement
In SEC v. MacDonald,9" the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit had an opportunity to consider the allowable recovery of
profits under the "disgorgement" theory in insider trading cases
brought by the Securities and Exchange Commission. 9' The court
stated:
The Commission correctly states the present question to be
whether, where a corporate officer fraudulently purchased com-
" See note 58 supra.
8 103 S.Ct. at 689.
" Such clarification seems all the more needed since the Court's action in Chemetron
might be thought to be inconsistent with its decision in Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington,
442 U.S. 560 (1979). There the Court, dealing with § 17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 (which imposes certain record keeping requirements on broker-dealers), held that
§ 17(a) of that Act did not create a private cause of action in view of the presence of an
express civil liability provision in § 18(a) of the Act. Noting that the express remedy pro-
vided for in § 18(a) is available only to persons who have purchased or sold a security at
a price which has been affected by false or misleading statements and that by allowing the
action under § 17 would extend liability to those who were merely customers of a broker-
dealer, the Court remarked: "[W]e are extremely reluctant to imply a cause of action in
§ 17(a) that is significantly broader than the remedy that Congress chose to provide." Id.
at 574. For further discussion of the Redington case, see Ham, Kentucky Law Survey-
Corporations, 68 Ky. L.J. 495, 500-04 (1979-80).
699 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1983).
" The SEC first successfully used the disgorgement theory for return of profits
resulting from unlawful insider trading activity in the well-known Texas Gulf Sulphur case.
See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1005 (1971). See generally Ellsworth, Disgorgement in Securities Fraud Actions Brought
by the SEC, 1977 DuKE L.J. 641.
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pany shares "while in possession of material non-public infor-
mation [he should be required, in an action brought by the Com-
mission,] to disgorge the entire profits he realized from his subse-
quent sale of those securities about a year later, rather than
limiting disgorgement to an amount representing the increased
value of the shares at a reasonable time after public dissemina-
tion of the information. " 92
In MacDonald, the Securities and Exchange Commission
charged the defendant, MacDonald, with unlawful insider trading
activity as chairman of the board of directors of Realty Income
Trust (RIT), a real estate investment trust.9 3 MacDonald had learned
of the acquisition by RIT of the Kroger Building in Cincinnati,
Ohio, and of promising negotiations pointing toward a profitable
long-term lease of vacant space in the building to Kenner Products,
which would raise the occupancy of the building to ninety-five
percent. 94 A report on the proposed lease was made to the board
of trustees of RIT, including defendant, on December 15, 1975. 91
The next day defendant's wife, acting on his behalf, purchased 100
shares of RIT stock through her broker at a price of 4 1/4.96 On
December 23, 1975, defendant went to the broker's, office and made
a purchase of 9,500 shares at 4 5/8.97 On the following day,
December 24, 1975, RIT issued a press release announcing its ac-
quisition of the Kroger Building and the proposed lease of space
in the building to Kenner Products. 8 As a result of this anounce-
ment the price of RIT stock went up in two days of trading from
4 5/8 to 5 1/2 and closed the year at 5 3/4.99 Defendant did not
dispose of his stock until 1977, when he sold it at an average price
of roughly $10 per share.'00 The SEC brought suit under section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule lOb-5
to require defendant to disgorge his entire profits realized on the
92 699 F.2d at 52.





91 Id. at 48-49.




purchase and sale of the 9,600 shares of RIT stock.'0' The district
court ordered defendant to disgorge the sum of $53,012, which
represented the profit realized by defendant when he sold his 9,600
shares of RIT stock in 1977 at roughly $10 per share."0 2
On appeal, the First Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the posi-
tion of the district court that the profits recovered from defendant
could include profits attributable to circumstances unrelated to the
undisclosed information.'0 3 The court of appeals noted that one
of the limits that had emerged in cases applying the "disgorgement"
theory was that "where the fraudulently obtained securities are
publicly traded, and hence readily available, the defrauded sellers
can recover only those accretions occurring up to a reasonable time
after they discovered the truth."'' 0 The court reasoned:
When a fraudulent buyer has reached the point of his full gain
from the fraud, viz., the market price a reasonable time after the
undisclosed information has become public, any consequence of
a subsequent decision, be it to sell or to retain the stock, is res
inter alios, not causally related to the fraud.'05
The court rejected the position of the Commission' 6 that in the
interests of promoting investor confidence and the integrity of the
nation's capital markets, the limitation on disgorgement of pro-
fits should be confined to private damage actions between in-
,0, Id. at 48.
, Id. at 52. The $53,012 so recovered was to be used for restitution to defrauded
shareholders. Id.
Id. at 54-55.
0 d. at 53. This is sometimes discussed in terms of "cover." The aim is to enable
the injured investor to regain the position the investor would have been in but for the
unlawful sale. See Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1004 (1971).
10 699 F.2d at 54. The court further remarked: "Conscious hedging aside, when a
seller of publicly traded securities has learned of previously undisclosed material facts, and
decides nevertheless not to replace the sold securities, he cannot later claim that his failure
to obtain subsequent stock appreciation was a proximate consequence of his prior ig-
norance." Id. at 53.
,o6 Id. at 55. The prevailing opinion on the disgorgement issue was an en banc opin-
ion (with Chief Judge Coffin and Circuit Judge Bownes dissenting). The en banc opinion
followed the grant of a petition for rehearing filed by the SEC from a panel decision by
Chief Judge Coffin and Judges Aldrich and Breyer, in which Chief Judge Coffin dissented.
The unanimous panel opinion on issues of materiality and scienter was left undisturbed.
Id. at 52 n.3.
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dividuals and should not apply when the Commission is the
plaintiff. 1 7 This suggestion did not appeal to the court as
"equitable" since the court thought it could act quite arbitrarily
"to charge one class of insiders more than others who had com-
mitted precisely the same fraudulent act" depending on when the
respective investors sold their stock. 108 So, the court concluded:
"On remand the district court should determine a figure based
upon the price of RIT stock a reasonable time after public
dissemination of the inside information."' 0 9
The decision in MacDonald no doubt came as a disappoint-
ment to the Commission, which has frequently sought to use the
"disgorgement" of profits as a policing tool in insider trading
cases."I0 As a result, the decision will no doubt provide the Com-
mission with additional incentive to induce Congress to enact the
Insider Trading Sanctions Act, with its treble damage remedy, pro-
posed by the Commission.' However, it should be noted that the
court in MacDonald limited its decision to publicly traded securities
where sellers can 'cover" by replacing the securities sold." 2 The
First Circuit reaffirmed its position in Janigan'  that, in the con-
text of a closely held corporation, it is appropriate to require
disgorgement of all profits, including even those profits that might
I' d. at 55. Chief Judge Coffin, in his dissenting opinion, remarked:
Unlike a private plaintiff, the SEC does not sue for injury to itself; nor does
it sue solely for the losses of sellers immediately injured by the defendant's fraud.
Rather, it sues for the whole injury inflicted by the fraud. That injury includes
the damage done to investor confidence and the integrity of the nation's capital
markets, and is necessarily greater than the profits at issue in a private suit.
.. . Although what we might all call private equity can give adequate protec-
tion to the individual, it seems to me that public equity in the contemporary world
should permit a court, in the exercise of its discretion under 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d),
to safeguard the integrity of the securities markets as a whole by imposing, in
a proper case, the civil sanction of full disgorgement of the actual profits of an
illegal bargain.
Id. at 55, (Coffin, J., dissenting).
,OS Id. at 54.
Id. at 55.
"' This is not the first case, however, in which the SEC has been rebuffed by the
courts. Similar decisions have refused to permit recovery of profits not causally related to
the insider trading. See, e.g., SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1335 (5th Cir. 1978); SEC v.
Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1104-05 (2d Cir. 1972).
' See note 12 supra.
699 F.2d at 53.
Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965).
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represent increases well beyond those that might have been fore-
seen by the buyer.'" Under such circumstances where the defrauded
seller has no market available through which to reinvest in the com-
pany's shares, " '[i]t is more appropriate to give the defrauded party
the benefit even of windfalls than to let the fraudulent party keep
them.' '""
D. Aiding and Abetting
Another recent case, Cleary v. Perfectune, Inc.," 6 presented
the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit with an opportunity to
consider the extent to which liability for aiding and abetting under
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and SEC Rule
10b-5 can consist solely of silence and inaction." 7 Liability for
aiding and abetting is, of course, a form of secondary liability
under the federal securities laws." 8
In Cleary, plaintiffs purchased shares of stock in Perfectune,
Inc., on the basis of an Offering Memorandum which plaintiffs
claimed was fraudulent. " 9 The corporation had been organized by
John W. McHugh to operate a chain of automobile tune-up
centers. 2 In the Offering Memorandum, McHugh had listed
defendants as directors without their knowledge or consent.' 2'
However, defendants were aware that McHugh was promoting
Perfectune, and each defendant received a copy of the Perfectune
Offering Memorandum. 2 2 None of the defendants objected to be-
ing listed as a director, and none of the defendants made any ef-
fort to inform the SEC, state authorities, or plaintiffs that they
had been listed as directors of Perfectune without their knowledge
' 699 F.2d at 53.
Id. (quoting Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d at 786).
116 700 F.2d 774 (Ist Cir. 1983).
"' Id. at 776.
1 For a general discussion of all phases of secondary liability, including aiding and
abetting, see Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting,
Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, Indemnification and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. Rv. 597
(1971-72).
23 700 F.2d at 776.





or consent.' 23 Perfectune failed, whereupon plaintiffs filed a suit
under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 in the United States District
Court for the District of Massachusetts to recover the purchase
price paid by them for the Perfectune stock. 124 Defendants were
charged as aiders and abettors of McHugh's alleged wrongful con-
duct in issuing and disseminating a fraudulent Offering
Memorandum. 125 The district court granted summary judgment for
the defendants on the ground that "the defendants were not liable
to the plaintiffs as aiders and abettors under § 10(b) and rule lOb-5
because the plaintiffs failed to raise genuine questions of material
fact concerning the elements of such liability.'
26
On appeal, the First Circuit Court of Appeals held that, since
the inaction and silence of the defendants was the sole basis on
which their aiding and abetting liability could be based, 2 7 and since
the recognized elements for invoking aiding and abetting liability
under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 were not met, 121 the granting
of summary judgment to defendants was proper. 129 The court in-
voked a tripartite test for establishing aider and abettor liability
under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 which included the following
elements: (1) commission of a primary violation of secton 10(b)
and rule 10b-5; (2) general awareness on the part of the secondary
party of having played a role in an improper activity; and (3) know-
ing and substantial assistance of the primary violation by the secon-
dary party. 13 The court determined that while genuine questions






121 Id. at 777.
I" d. at 778.
O Id. at 777. These elements were first enunciated by the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals in SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975),
where the court said:
Without meaning to set forth an inflexible definition of aiding and abetting, we
find that a person may be held as an aider and abettor only if some other party
has committed a securities law violation, if the accused party had general
awareness that his role was part of an overall activity that is improper, and if




of section 10(b) and rule 1Ob-5,1 3' genuine questions of material
fact were absent in regard to defendants' awareness of their role
in an improper activity'32 and in regard to defendants giving know-
ing and substantial assistance to any alleged violations. 33
As to the requirement of awareness of a role in an improper
activity, the court declared:
Courts generally have held that in the absence of a duty of
disclosure, a defendant should be held liable as an aider and
abettor only if the plaintiff proves that the defendant had actual
knowledge of the improper activity of the primary violator and
of his role in that activity. '
Since plaintiffs had failed to show any actual awareness on the part
of defendants of the impropriety of McHugh's activity,'" and since
there were no facts which established a duty of disclosure on the
defendants,'36 the court concluded that plaintiffs had failed to pro-
duce evidence which would create genuine questions of material
fact sufficient to prevent summary judgment.
37
On the issue of knowing and substantial assistance, the court
noted a disagreement among courts regarding "the standard to be
applied to determine whether inaction, such as the failure of the
defendants in this case to inform anyone that they were not direc-
tors at the time the Offering Memorandum was issued, can con-
stitute knowing and substantial assistance of the primary
violation.' 3 1 The court further stated:
Several courts have suggested that absent an independent duty
to act, inaction cannot constitute the assistance necessary to sup-
port the imposition of liability for aiding and abet-
ting .... Other courts have held that in the absence of an inde-
700 F.2d at 777.
"' Id. at 777-78.
"' Id. at 778-79.
, Id. at 777. The court pointed out that when a duty of disclosure is present, such
as where a person possesses inside information or is an accountant or broker possessing
special obligations, "courts have been willing to impose liability on the basis of a recklessness
standard." Id.
", Id. at 778.
,36 Id. at 777.




pendent duty to act mere inaction will constitute substantial
assistance only where there was a conscious intention to further
the principal violation.'39
Since plaintiffs had failed to produce any evidence from which an
inference could be drawn that defendants through their inaction
were consciously intending to further McHugh's allegedly
fraudulent activity, the court decided that it did not need to choose
between the two standards. 40
Although Cleary is only one of many cases in the lower federal
courts that have considered aiding and abetting liability under sec-
tion 10(b) and rule lOb-5,1'4 it does provide an instructive analysis
of the difficulties the courts have had in determining the extent to
which silence and inaction can form the basis for aiding and abet-
ting liability.'" Of course, the entire concept of aiding and abet-
ting as a permissible source of liability under section 10(b) and rule
lOb-5 still remains unanswered by the United States Supreme Court,
which has specifically refrained from passing on that issue in its
recent antifraud decisions.' 3
II. STATE CoRPoATIoN LAW
A. Cash-out Mergers
Turning to developments in state corporation law, the most
noteworthy recent case is one from the Supreme Court of
"I Id. (citations omitted).
,,1 Id. at 778-79.
'" For a discussion of such cases see Comment, Establishment of Liability for Aiding
and Abetting Fraud Under Rule lOb-5 and the Common Law, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 862
(1978).
24 The court also considered the possible liability of defendants for aiding and abet-
ting in violation of § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, which broadly condemns fraudulent
conduct "in the offer or sale of" securities. See 700 F.2d at 779-80. Conceding that "[t]he
standards to be applied in a case of aiding and abetting a violation of § 17(a) are less well-
settled than those applied in cases involving a violation of § 10(b) and rule lOb-5," the
court nevertheless concluded that the tripartite test used for § 10(b) actions should also be
extended to § 17(a) actions. Id.
14, See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 191 n.7. The Court stated:
In view of our holding that an intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud is re-
quired for civil liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b(5), we need not consider
whether civil liability for aiding and abetting is appropriate under the section and
the rule, nor the elements necessary to establish such a cause of action.
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Delaware, Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,144 in which the court
eliminated the "business purpose" requirement for testing the
legality of cash-out mergers previously adopted by the Delaware
Supreme Court in the Singer/Tanzer sequence of cases.' 45
In Weinberger, Signal Companies, Inc., a diversified holding
company, seeking to invest surplus cash which it had obtained
through sale of one of its wholly owned subsidiaries, acquired a
50.5% interest in the outstanding shares of UOP, Inc.' 46 Subse-
quently, as the result of a feasibility study made by two directors
of Signal, who also served on the board of directors of UOP, Signal
determined to acquire the remaining 49.5% of UOP shares through
a cash-out merger in the range of $20 to $21 per share, although
the feasibility report had concluded that "it would be a good in-
vestment for Signal to acquire the remaining 49.5 % of UOP shares
"' 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
,,1 Id. at 715. The Singer/Tanzer sequence involved the trilogy of Singer v. Magnavox
Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977); Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121
(Del. 1977); Roland Int'l Corp. v. Najjar, 407 A.2d 1032 (Del. 1979). In Singer, the Supreme
Court of Delaware had expressed the "business purpose" test in the following language:
We hold, therefore, that a § 251 merger [long form merger], made for the
sole purpose of freezing out minority stockholders, is an abuse of the corporate
process; and the complaint, which so alleges in this suit, states a cause of action
for violation of a fiduciary duty for which the Court may grant such relief as
it deems appropriate under the circumstances.
This is not to say, however, that merely because the Court finds that a cash-
out merger was not made for the sole purpose of freezing out minority
stockholders, all relief must be denied to the minority stockholders in a § 251
merger. On the contrary, the fiduciary obligation of the majority to the minority
stockholders remains and proof of a purpose, other than such freezeout, without
more, will not necessarily discharge it. In such case the Court will scrutinize the
circumstances for compliance with the Sterling rule of "entire fairness" and, if
it finds a violation thereof, will grant such relief as equity may require.
380 A.2d at 980. The Sterling case referred to by the court in Singer was Sterling v.
Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107 (Del. 1952), involving a proposed merger of Mayflower
Hotel Corporation into its parent corporation, Hilton Hotels Corporation. In Sterling, the
Delaware Supreme Court treated Hilton, the majority shareholder of Mayflower, as bear-
ing the burden of establishing the "entire fairness" of the proposed merger. See 93 A.2d
at 109-10.
In Tanzer, which followed immediately after Singer, the Delaware Supreme Court held
that the business purpose required by Singer could consist of a legitimate business purpose
designed to benefit the majority shareholder. See 379 A.2d at 1124-25. The Najjar case
extended the Singer!Tanzer doctrine to short-form mergers under § 253 of the Delaware
General Corporation Law. See 407 A.2d at 1033. The Singer!Tanzer sequence of cases is
discussed in Ham, Kentucky Law Survey-Corporations, 67 Ky. L.J. 457, 472-80 (1978-79).
,41 457 A.2d at 704.
KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL
at any price up to $24 each."' 4 7 Neither the outside non-Signal
members of the UOP board nor the minority shareholders of UOP
were informed of the feasibility study. 4 At the annual meeting
of the UOP shareholders, 51.9% of the minority shareholders voted
for the merger, which when added to the UOP stock owned by
Signal resulted in an approval of the merger by a total of 76.2%
of UOP's outstanding shares. 49 On the effective date of the merger
which followed, each share of the UOP minority stock was
automatically converted into a right to receive $21 in cash. 5' Plain-
tiff, a minority shareholder in UOP, brought a class action in the
Court of Chancery of Delaware challenging the legality of the cash-
out merger between Signal and UOP.15 ' The Delaware chancellor
found the terms of the merger to be fair to the minority
shareholders of UOP and decided for the defendants, who included
Signal, UOP and certain officers and directors of those
companies. .
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Delaware, disagreeing with
the findings of the chancellor that the circumstances of the merger
and the price paid the minority shareholders in UOP were fair,
reversed the judgment and remanded the case for further
proceedings.' 53 The court held that since Signal was the majority
shareholder in UOP, its failure to inform the UOP minority
shareholders of the contents of the feasibility study was a breach
of fiduciary duty which precluded the merger from meeting the test
of fairness." 4 However, in considering the proper remedy to give
"I Id. at 705.
141 Id. at 707.
,41 Id. at 708.
'~ Id.
,' Id. at 703.
2Id. Lehman Brothers Kuhn Loeb, Inc., an investment banking company, which
had been employed by UOP to render a fairness opinion as to the price offered the minority
for their stock, was also named as a defendant in the original action but was later dismiss-
ed by plaintiff. Id.
Id. at 715.
Id. at 711-12. Recognizing the importance of the price information contained in
the feasibility report to an informed vote of the minority stockholders of UOP, the court
remarked:
IT]he minority stockholders were denied the critical information that Signal con-
sidered a price of $24 to be a good investment. Since this would have meant over
$17,000,000 more to the minority, we cannot conclude that the shareholder vote
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minority shareholders under Delaware law in cash-out mergers, the
court concluded the remedy should be an appraisal under the
Delaware appraisal statute.1 5 But, to give full effect to the appraisal
statute, the court added that it was adopting "a more liberal, less
rigid and stylized, approach to the valuation process than has
heretofore been permitted by our courts."'"6 The chancellor had
used the "Delaware block" approach in determining the value of
plaintiffs' stock, 157 by weighting the three elements of value con-
sisting of assets, market price and earnings,'" and had rejected a
discounted cash flow method of valuing UOP's stock which had
been offered by plaintiff.'59 Disagreeing with this restricted
approach to valuation, the supreme court commented: "[Tihe stan-
dard 'Delaware block' or weighted average method of valuation,
formerly employed in appraisal and other stock valuation cases,
shall no longer exclusively control such proceedings."' 60 The court
added that it believed " a more liberal approach must include proof
of value by any techniques or methods which are generally con-
sidered acceptable in the financial community and otherwise ad-
missible in court,"'' which would "obviate the very structured and
mechanistic procedure that has heretofore governed such
matters."'6
Although the Delaware Supreme Court made it clear that in
the future the appraisal remedy will normally be the only recourse
the minority shareholder can expect to have in a cash-out merger,
was an informed one. Under the circumstances, an approval by a majority of
the minority was meaningless.
Id. at 712 (citations omitted).
" Id. at 703. The Delaware appraisal provisions are contained in § 262 of the Delaware
General Corporation law. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (Michie Supp. 1982).
"3 457 A.2d at 704.
,37 Id. at 712. The Kentucky Court of Appeals approved the "Delaware block" ap-
proach in Ford v. Courier-Journal Job Printing Co., 639 S.W.2d 553 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982),
discretionary rev. denied (Ky. Oct. 6, 1982). Ford is reviewed in Ham, Kentucky Law
Survey-Corporations, 71 Ky. L.J. 251, 272-77 (1982-83).
" 457 A.2d at 712. See generally Note, The Dissenting Shareholder's Appraisal
Remedy, 30 OiaA. L. REv. 629 (1977) (contains discussion of the elements of value and
a chart showing the weights given to those elements in a group of selected valuation cases).
457 A.2d at 712.
,60 Id. at 712-13.
,61 Id. at 713.
362 Id. (citations omitted).
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the court did leave open the possibility of other forms of relief in
particularly egregious cases. 63 The court remarked: "The appraisal
remedy we approve may not be adequate in certain cases, par-
ticularly where fraud, misrepresentation, self-dealing, deliberate
waste of corporate assets, or gross and palpable overreaching are
involved." 64 However, as to the availability of the "business pur-
pose" test for invalidating a cash-out merger, the court held that
such requirement was no longer to have any force or effect."65 The
court noted that in view of "the expanded appraisal remedy now
available to shareholders, and the broad discretion of the
Chancellor to fashion such relief as the facts of a given case may
dictate, we do not believe that any additional meaningful protec-
tion is afforded minority shareholders by the business purpose
requirement."
166
It is not likely that the discarding of the Singer!Tanzer business
purpose test in Weinberger will detract much from the position of
minority shareholders in cash-out mergers because of the ease in
showing some legitimate business purpose.' 67 However, the relega-
tion of minority shareholders to monetary relief in the context of
an expanded appraisal remedy may not represent much of a gain
to such minority shareholders in view of the procedural complex-
ities and technicalities which surround the appraisal remedy.'
68
B. Tender Offers
The Kentucky case of most interest decided during the present
Survey period was undoubtedly Esmark, Inc. v. Strode, 69 in which
363 Id. at 714. The court observed that "[wihile a plaintiff's monetary remedy ordinarily
should be confined to the more liberalized appraisal proceeding herein established, we do
not intend any limitation on the historic powers of the Chancellor to grant such other relief
as the facts of a particular case may dictate." Id.
16 Id. (citation omitted).
36$ Id. at 715.
166 Id.
367 See Weiss, The Law of Take Out Mergers: A Historical Perspective, 56 N.Y.U.
L. RE. 624, 667-71 (1981).
6I This is further compounded by the literal construction courts customarily give to
appraisal statutes, demanding that dissenting shareholders strictly comply with the procedural
technicalities. See, e.g., F. S. Moseley & Co. v. Midland-Ross Corp., 179 A.2d 295, 296-97
(Del. 1962).
,' 639 S.W.2d 768 (Ky. 1982), rev'g 28 KLS 5, at 2 (Ky. Ct. App. April 3, 1981).
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the Supreme Court of Kentucky declared unconstitutional the Ken-
tucky Take-Over Act, enacted in 1976. ," In doing so, the Court
relied heavily on the recent decision by the United States Supreme
Court in Edgar v. MITE Corp.,' 7' declaring a similar Illinois statute
unconstitutional. 
72
Esmark resulted from an effort on the part of Esmark, Inc.,
a Delaware corporation with its principal business office in
Chicago, Illinois, to acquire Reliance Universal, Inc., a Kentucky
corporation, with its principal place of business in Louisville, Ken-
tucky, through a series of open market purchases of Reliance
stock.' 73 James C. Strode, Director of Securities of the Department
of Banking and Securities for the Commonwealth of Kentucky, fil-
ed suit against Esmark charging Esmark with making a tender offer
in violation of the provisions of the Kentucky Take-Over Act. 
74
The trial court enjoined Esmark from continuing its purchases of
Reliance stock and from making a takeover bid, and ordered
divestiture by Esmark of all its Reliance stock in excess of five
percent.' 75The Kentucky Court of Appeals upheld the constitu-
tionality of the Kentucky Take-Over Act and affirmed that por-
tion of the trial court judgment enjoining Esmark from further ac-
quisitions of Reliance stock.' 76 The court of appeals, however,
reversed the order of divestiture on the ground that the Take-over
Act was a part of the provisions of the Kentucky Securities Act,
which only authorized injunctive relief, not divestiture.'
77
Finding that the provisions of the Kentucky Take-Over Act
," Id. at 770. The Kentucky Takeover Act is codified at Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§
292.560-.630 (Bobbs-Merrill 1981 & Cum. Supp. 1982) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
" 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
"7 Id. at 646. For the text of the Illinois statute, see ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 1/2,
§§ 137.51-.70 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983-84).
1 639 S.W.2d at 769.
'" Id.
"I Id. at 769-70. The Kentucky Act defined "takeover bid" as any tender offer made
to ten or more shareholders of a corporation which, if successful, would result in the offeror
becoming the owner of more than five percent of any class of the corporation's stock. See
KRS § 292.560(1). The Kentucky Supreme Court in Esmark did not determine whether a
"creeping tender offer," such as involved in the open market purchases of Reliance Universal
stock by Esmark, should come within the prohibitions of takeover legislation. See 639
S.W.2d at 774.
"' 639 S.W.2d at 769-70.
See 28 KLS 5, at 2.
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paralleled so closely the provisions of the Illinois takeover statute
"as to make the holdings in MITE applicable,""' the Supreme
Court of Kentucky reversed the holding of the court of appeals
concerning the validity of the provisions of the Kentucky Act.'
79
In reversing the court of appeals and finding the Kentucky Act un-
constitutional, the Supreme Court gave MITE its broadest possi-
ble effect by holding both that the Illinois statute was preempted
at the federal level' by the Williams Act,' 8 ' and that the Illinois
statute was an undue burden on interstate commerce' 8 ' under the
commerce clause of the United States Constitution.'13 Actually, the
only consensus holding in MITE was that the Illinois Business
Take-Over Act constituted an unlawful indirect burden on interstate
commerce.' 84 However, Justice White wrote a comprehensive opin-
ion in which he found the Illinois Act violated not only the
supremacy clause of the United States Constitution,' but also the
commerce clause of the Constitution. The commerce clause viola-
tion arose both because the extraterritorial effect of the Illinois Act
constituted a direct restraint on interstate commerce and because,
even if the Illinois Act were treated as regulating interstate com-
merce only indirectly, the burden on such commerce under the Il-
linois Act was excessive in relation to the local interests served by
the statute. 6
On the preemption issue, Justice White found the Illinois Act
to be in conflict with the Williams Act by violating the neutrality
position sought to be maintained under the Williams Act as be-
tween management of target companies and tender offerors in three
respects: (1) by including precommencement notification provisions
before a tender offer could become effective, 8 7 (2) by including
639 S.W.2d at 773.
Id. at 775.
"° Id. at 771-73.
15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1976).
639 S.W.2d at 773-74.
18 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
11 457 U.S. at 646 (J. Powell, concurring). For a discussion of the fragmented nature
of the Supreme Court's opinion in MITE, see Ham, Kentucky Law Survey-Corporations,
71 Ky. L.J. 251, 252-61 (1982-83).
I", U.S. CONST. art. VI, ci. 2. See 457 U.S. at 630-40 for a discussion of the supremacy
clause question.
186 457 U.S. at 640-46.
,, Id. at 635-36.
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hearing provisions allowing the Illinois Secretary of State to hold
hearings with respect to a tender offer,'88 and (3) by including pro-
visions permitting the Illinois Secretary of State to pass on the
fairness of a tender offer.' 8 9 Justice Stephenson, writing for the
Supreme Court of Kentucky in Strode, found sufficient similarities
in the provisions of the Kentucky Take-Over Act to those contained
in the Illinois Act to warrant application of the conclusions as to
preemption expressed by Justice White in MITE.19 Justice Stephen-
son likewise found that the extraterritorial provisions of the Ken-
tucky Act violated the commerce clause, both directly and indirect-
ly, in the same manner that Justice White had found the Illinois
provisions to violate the commerce clause.191
Therefore, although the holding by the Supreme Court of Ken-
tucky as to the constitutionality of takeover statutes of the Ken-
tucky and Illinois type is perhaps somewhat more comprehensive
' Id. at 636-37.
See id. at 639-40.
,90 639 S.W.2d at 770-73. The major difference between the Illinois Act and the Ken-
tucky Act in regard to the three elements discussed in MITE was that the Kentucky Act
did not allow an inquiry into the fairness of the offer as under the Illinois Act. Id. at 773.
Under the Illinois Business Take-Over Act, if the Secretary of State determined that the
takeover offer was "inequitable or would work or tend to work a fraud or deceit upon
the offerees,".the registration of the takeover offer could be denied or conditioned upon
certain modifications. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, § 137.57.E. Although not providing
for a fairness review, the Kentucky Act provided that in a hearing held by the Director
of Securities the director was to make a determination whether the offeror proposed "to
make fair, full and effective disclosure to offerees of all information material to a deci-
sion to accept or reject the offer." See KRS § 292.570(l)(c). Justice Stephenson found con-
flict between this disclosure provision and the disclosure provisions of the Williams Act:
The conflict here is that the terms of the disclosure in the Williams Act are set
out in information required to be incorporated in Schedule 14D and Schedule
13D filed with the SEC and the disclosure requirements are tested by the Williams
Act in that form and not by the director of securities in this state.
639 S.W.2d at 773.
" ' Compare 639 S.W.2d at 773-74 with 457 U.S. at 640. The Kentucky Act applied
to tender offers made to security holders of corporations organized under the laws of Ken-
tucky or having their principal place of business and substantial assets within the state. See
KRS § 292.560(1). Justice Stephenson found certain language in MITE to be particularly
relevant to the Kentucky Act:
The Illinois Act violates these principles for two reasons. First, it directly regulates
and prevents, unless its terms are satisfied, interstate tendered offers which in
turn would generate interstate transactions. Second, the burden the Act imposes
on interstate commerce is excessive in light of the local interests the Act purports
to further.
639 S.W.2d at 773 (quoting Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. at 640).
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than the actual holding of the Supreme Court of the United States
as to the constitutionality of the Illinois statute in MITE, the
message seems clear that state takeover legislation is going to re-
main suspect to the extent that it attempts to regulate more than
intrastate takeover situations. '
C. Right of Inspection
In another decision handed down by the Delaware Supreme
Court during the Survey period, CM & M Group, Inc. v. Carroll,'93
the court once again considered the scope of a shareholder's right
to inspect the books and records of a corporation.'9 4 The plain-
tiff, Carroll, was one of the founders of Carroll, McEntee and
McGinley, Inc., which acted as a broker in United States govern-
ment securities.' 5 He possessed a fifty-one percent controlling in-
terest in the firm and served as the company's president and chair-
man of the board.' 96 Due to personality conflicts which developed
between Carroll and key employees of the firm, Carroll relinquish-
ed control of the corporation by selling approximately one-third
of his shares back to the firm and resigning as president and chair-
man of the board.'9 7 During the period from 1970 to 1980, the Car-
roll, McEntee firm prospered, growing in size to eight companies.'S
Management reorganized the corporate structure by forming CM
& M as a "holding company for all eight subsidiaries, including
Carroll, McEntee."' 99 Carroll became the largest single shareholder
in CM & M, owning approximately one-third of its shares."' Short-
ly after the 1980 reorganization, Carroll contacted an investment
firm concerning the sale of his interest in CM & M. 2°' In addition,
Carroll made a written demand on CM & M for inspection of the
"I See Bloomenthal, The New Tender Offer Regimen, State Regulation, and Preemp-
tion, 30 EMORY L.J. 35, 57-71 (1981).
1 453 A.2d 788 (Del. 1982).
,94 Id. at 792. The variety of questions that can arise with reference to a shareholder's
right of inspection are myriad. See generally W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 344-53 (5th ed. 1980).









quarterly financial statements of CM & M and Carroll, McEntee
but his request was refused.20 2 In an ensuing suit brought by Car-
roll to enforce his right of inspection, the Delaware Chancery Court
ordered CM & M to produce for Carroll's inspection and copy-
ing certain categories of books and records not in Carroll's
possession." 3
On appeal, CM & M contended that Carroll's request for in-
spection was not for a "proper purpose" as required by the
Delaware General Corporation Law.20 CM & M argued that Car-
roll's actual purpose was "to procure all the financial information
pertaining to CM & M that some potential third-party buyer might
want, ' 25 and that, therefore, the information was not really for
Carroll's inspection to value and sell his stock but for outside third
parties who were not shareholders of CM & M.20
Rejecting these contentions by CM & M as untenable, the
Supreme Court of Delaware supported the position of the court
of chancery and ordered inspection. 27 The court stated: "The para-
mount factor in determining whether a stockholder is entitled to
inspection of corporate books and records is the propriety of the
stockholder's purpose in seeking such inspection .... [O]nce a
proper purpose has been established, any secondary purpose or
ulterior motive of the stockholder becomes irrelevant. ' 20 8 The
supreme court concluded: "Having found a proper purpose, the
Court properly passed over any ancillary purpose of Carroll's to
coerce CM & M to purchase his shares. ' 2 9 Recognizing, however,
that allowing Carroll a general right of inspection could lead to
202 Id. at 791.
202 Id.
204 Id. at 792 For the text of the Delaware statute, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220
(1975 & Supp. 1982). The Delaware statute defines proper purpose as "a purpose reasonably
related to such person's interest as a stockholder." DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 8, § 220(b). The
Kentucky Business Corporation Act also recognizes the shareholder's right of inspection
for any proper purpose "at any reasonable time or times." See KRS § 271A.260(2)(1981).
This was also the common law rule. See 5 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
PRIVATE COP'OATIONS § 2214 (rev. perm. ed. 1976).
20 453 A.2d at 792.
206 Id.
20 Id. at 793.
203 Id. at 792 (citations omitted).
209 Id. at 793 (citations omitted). CM & M had contended that Carroll's request con-
stituted "a thinly-veiled attempt to force CM & M to buy his stock at an unfairly inflated




confidential corporate financial data reaching the hands of persons
not genuinely interested in the purchase of his shares, the supreme
court held that the Delaware Court of Chancery should exercise
its powers to prevent possible abuse of the shareholder's right of
inspection "by placing such reasonable restrictions and limitations
as it deems proper on the exercise of the right."2 ' The supreme
court, therefore, remanded the case to the court of chancery with
carefully drawn directions to modify its judgment to make Car-
roll's right of inspection contingent upon the following
requirement:
[N]either the plaintiff nor any agent of his shall disclose infor-
mation obtained as a result of these proceedings to anyone who
has not first made a written representation to the plaintiff that
he is a bona fide prospective purchaser of Carroll's stock and
executed an agreement of confidentiality, both to be in form
approved by the Court of Chancery.III
Over the years, many cases in Delaware and elsewhere have
considered shareholder requests for inspection of the books and
records of a corporation. However, this particular decision by the
Delaware Supreme Court seems to reflect a particularly perceptive
approach to balancing the rights of the shareholder and the interests
of the corporation in these types of cases.2" 2
D. Authority of President
A recent case decided by the Supreme Court of Utah, Lloydona
110 Id. at 793-94. The Delaware inspection statute provides that "[t]he Court may,
in its discretion, prescribe any limitations or conditions with reference to the inspection,
or award such other or further relief as the Court may deem just and proper." See DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(c).
211 453 A.2d at 794. As part of its order the supreme court also added the require-
ment that "[t]he name and address of any such prospective purchaser, together with such
representation and agreement, shall be served and filed by the plaintiff in this cause at least
5 days before any such disclosure." Id. In its order on remand, the supreme court also
directed that the court of chancery include in its judgment a stipulation that any violations
of the conditions imposed would expose the plaintiff and any prospective purchaser to possi-
ble sanctions by the court of chancery, as well as a stipulation that the court of chancery
would retain jurisdiction for a period of two years to hear and determine any application
for such a sanction. Id.
22 See generally Starr & Schmidt, Inspection Rights of Corporate Stockholders:
Toward a More Effective Statutory Model, 26 U. FLA. L. Ray. 173 (1974) (evaluates various
statutory efforts to balance shareholder and corporate interests in this area).
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Peters Enterprises v. Dorius,' 3 demonstrates that there are still
jurisdictions in this country that adhere to the traditional
viewpoint 214 that the president of a corporation generally has no
inherent power merely by virtue of that office to act on behalf of
the corporation.2 '5
Lloydona Peters Enterprises, Inc. (LPE) was owned by four
sisters, one of whom was defendant DeLoris P. Dorius. 2 6 Each
sister served as a director and officer of the corporation and owned
an equal share in the stock of the corporation, whose assets con-
sisted of real property which the sisters had inherited from their
mother.2 '7 In December, 1971, DeLoris P. Dorius and her husband
purchased an office building, with LPE agreeing to pay a portion
of the purchase price in return for a promise by Dorius and her
husband that they would convey to LPE an undivided one-half in-
terest on final payment.21 8 In 1978, when payments on the property
were nearly completed, the Doriuses discussed the possibility of a
sale of LPE's interest in the property to them. 219 Following ap-
praisals of the property at the instigation of the board of direc-
tors of LPE, the Doriuses tendered to Gay P. Driggs, treasurer and
director of LPE, a check for $14,000, representing the value of
LPE's interest in the property based on the higher of the two ap-
praisals that had been secured on the property.22 Although all four
of the directors of the corporation recognized this appraisal as
valid, two of the four directors remained undecided as to whether
LPE should sell its interest at the tendered price. 22' Despite this
lack of agreement, Driggs deposited the Doriuses' check in LPE's
bank account.22 2 The Doriuses thereafter treated LPE as having
no further interest in the office building and discontinued rental
payments which they had previously been making on the
property.223
21 658 P.2d 1209 (Utah 1983).
2,1 See 2A W. FLETCHER, supra note 204, at § 557 (rev. perm. ed. 1982).
21 658 P.2d at 1212.










About two and one-half years later, without any authorization
from the board of directors, Jean P. Hull, as president of LPE,
brought a suit for specific performance on behalf of the corpora-
tion to require the Doriuses to execute a warranty deed to an un-
divided one-half interest in the corporation. 24 The Doriuses, claim-
ing lack of authority in Hull to initiate litigation on behalf of LPE,
entered a motion to dismiss the suit.225 The trial court granted the
motion to dismiss, and this was affirmed on appeal.
226
Citing an earlier Utah case in which the court had called at-
tention to the "board action" rule that directors must act as a body
and not individually, 227 the Supreme Court of Utah remarked that
"this Court has consistently refused to uphold the power of a cor-
porate president to act in behalf of his corporation without
authorization from its board of directors. ' 228 Referring to an
exception to the general rule which recognizes the power of the
president to act on behalf of the corporation when necessary to
preserve the assets of the corporation, the court found no basis
for application of the exception in the Dorius case. 229 Noting that
through the $14,000 payment tendered by the Doriuses, "LPE has
already on hand the sum apparently equal to the value of its in-
terest in the property which Hull claims to be protecting in initiating
this suit," 230 the court determined that "LPE faces no 'irreparable
loss' in the event of failure to initiate legal action. ' 231 The court
224 Id. at 1210-11.
223 Id. at 1211.
226 Id. at 1211-12.
"' See Lochwitz v. Pine Tree Mining & Milling Co., 108 P. 1128, 1130 (Utah 1910).
2' 658 P.2d at 1211. The court supported this postion with the following provision
in the Utah Business Corporation Act:
All officers and agents of the corporation, as between themselves and the cor-
poration, shall have such authority and perform such duties in the management
of the corporation as may be provided in the bylaws, or as may be determined
by resolution of the board of directors not inconsistent with the bylaws.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-45 (1973). A similar provision appears in the Kentucky Business
Corporation Act. See KRS § 271A.250(2) (1981).
229 658 P.2d at 1211 (quoting Kamas Sec. Co. v. Taylor, 226 P.2d 111, 115 (1950)).
230 Id. at 1211-12.
23, Id. at 1212. In evaluating the $14,000 payment, the court also noted that all four
directors of LPE had accepted as valid the appraisal on which that valuation was based,
and that the two directors who had objected to the transaction had made no effort to return




concluded: "The facts of the present case therefore fail to justify
any departure from the general rule prohibiting unauthorized acts
by a corporate president." '232
It has been said that the rule applied by the Utah court in the
Dorius case maintains today "a respectable following in just under
half the states." '233 Kentucky is one of these states.3 The former
Court of Appeals of Kentucky remarked:
It has long been settled in this state that an officer of a cor-
poration has no general authority to execute contracts on behalf
of the corporation. Authority to bind the corporation must come
either from the by-laws or the board of directors, or the action
of the officer must be of the nature that comes within the
apparent scope of his employment.
2 35
A developing viewpoint in some jurisdictions, which- has been
described as "the liberal and modern rule," is that the president
by virtue of his office is presumed to be able to enter into trans-
actions that pertain to the ordinary business of the corporation,
unless the contrary appears or it is expressly stated that the presi-
dent has no such powers.2 36 One problem with the "ordinary
business" approach has been determining what actions are "or-
dinary" as distinguished from "extraordinary," particularly since
what constitutes "extraordinary" action has considerably narrowed
232 Id. at 1212. In a dissenting opinion, Judge Durham suggested that the LPE situa-
tion came within the exception to the general rule regarding the powers of a corporate presi-
dent, "that a corporate president may act for the corporation in the absence of authoriza-
tion from the board of directors in order to preserve or protect corporate assets." id.
(Durham, J., dissenting). Treating the deadlock on the board as preventing a valid sale,
Judge Durham stated: "In the absence of a valid sale, LPE is being deprived (perhaps per-
manently) both of title to its undivided one-half interest in property, which may be ap-
preciating in value, and of its share of the past and future rents." Id. (Durham, J.,
dissenting).
"I 2A W. FLETCHER, supra note 204, at § 557 (rev. perm. ed. 1982).
21' See, e.g., Har-Bel Coal Co. v. Asher Coal Mining Co., 414 S.W.2d 128 (Ky. 1967).
In this case, the Asher Coal Mining Co. was in the business of acquiring coal-bearing lands
and then leasing the lands to various business firms for the purpose of extracting and
marketing coal. On one occasion, the president of Asher Coal Mining Co., Robert Asher,
executed a lease under his own signature alone. The validity of the lease was later challenged
on the ground of the lack of authority in the president to act without approval of the board
and this challenge was upheld. Id. at 130.
"I Id. at 130.
216 See 2A W. FLETCHER, supra note 204, § 559, at 24 (rev. perm. ed. 1982).
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under the impact of modern corporate life.237 Indeed, these modem
corporate pressures have even induced courts to recognize the in-
herent authority of presidents to act where their action is conceded
to have been beyond the usual course of business of the
corporation. 28 The Dorius case would indicate a continued
resistance to any such trend.
2 39
237 See, e.g., Lee v. Jenkins Bros., 268 F.2d 357, 364-71 (2d Cir.)(discusses the distinc-
tion between ordinary and extraordinary business in the context of pension contracts), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 913 (1959).
Is See, e.g., Yucca Mining & Petroleum Co. v. Howard C. Phillips Oil Co., 365 P.2d
925, 929 (N.M. 1961)(oil well drilling contract). In Yucca, the court remarked:
Although ordinarily a corporation can only act through its directors as to any
matters that are not in the usual course of the daily operation of the business,
it is recognized that, with the swift pace of modern business life, it is impossible
to expect action by the directors in every transaction, even though it may be term-
ed "unusual."
Id. at 929.
239 However, if a president serves also in some other capacity, such as the general
manager of the corporation, his power to act on behalf of the corporation may be con-
sidered greater than it would have been in his capacity as president alone. See, e.g., Memorial
Hosp. Ass'n v. Pacific Grape Prods. Co., 290 P.2d 481 (Cal. 1955)(en banc). For a discus-
sion of the authority of corporate officers, see generally W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra
note 194, at 185-92.
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